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ABSTRACT
The frequency of natural disasters occurrences has increased and is becoming noticed by many due to the
impact on economy, society, and the environment.
Decision making during disasters contributes towards community safety and resilience. Decisions taken to
protect people from disasters have an impact on society, economy, environment, travel patterns, and reliability
and performance of transport networks. Decisions often affect the performance of transport networks and critical
infrastructure systems during disasters and during demand times.
Decision making and decision styles which were observed during disaster events will show the areas that the
decisions have worked well or created more risks to the society. Risks to the community due to environmental
disasters are high, and they are worsened when integrated with poor decision making and actions. Good
decision making provides for community resilience, good connectivity between cities, improved efficiency, safety
to communities, and improved network reliability to all road users during disasters.
This paper will examine decision-making scenarios used during disasters and how they impacted the community
and provided for community resilience. The case study will identify ways to integrate decision making into
disaster risk reduction and shows the decisions made during extreme events and how they impacted on the
community and transport infrastructure.
Keywords: decision making, community resilience, transport planning
1. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Decisions made during disasters will have numerous
effects on the long-term performance of a country’s
infrastructure as well as the resilience of
communities. A research project conducted at RMIT
University in collaboration with the City of Greater
Geelong Council in Victoria, Australia, aimed to
identify gaps in the decision-making process that
contribute to risk and resilience of performance of
critical infrastructure. Triple bottom line analysis was
carried out to identify how decision making impacts
the economy, environment, and the society. The
process relied heavily on recorded case studies of
natural disaster and decision-making failure and
gaps. The overall research framework is shown in
Figure 1.
Decision intensity changes according to the dynamic
nature of the disaster. Decisions made during normal
day-to-day conditions against decisions made during
disaster events have totally different decision-making
styles. The impacts from these two decision-making
scenarios will have numerous effects on the longterm performance of a community’s resilience,
economy, environment, and critical infrastructure.

This paper focuses on the decision making during a
disaster scenario to ascertain the impact and the
gaps for improvement.
2. DISASTERS
There are many types of disasters which impact all
countries, Natural and man-made hazards have the
same end result of causing death for people and
animals, destroying infrastructure, and causing
damage to the economy of communities and
countries. The effects of disasters are felt immediately
in some instances, and in others it is felt at a later
time. The secondary impacts could be the effects on
critical infrastructure failures. A hazard is a physical
event, phenomenon, or human activity that can cause
the loss of life or injury, property damage, social and
economic disruption, or environmental degradation
(Leoni, Radford, & Schulman, 2010). So the hazards
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have the capability to directly cause damage and
destruction or have a secondary impact. Disasters are
a combination of hazards, conditions of vulnerability, and
insufficient capacity or measures to reduce the negative
consequences of risk. A hazard becomes a disaster
when it coincides with a vulnerable situation, such as
when societies or communities are unable to cope using
their own resources and capacities (Leoni et al., 2010).

Disasters resulting from such natural hazards as
tropical cyclones, windstorms, floods, and related
landslides affect the most people. Such weatherrelated disasters represented about 81% of all events,
72% of all economic losses, and 23% of fatalities from
2000–2010. On average, about 37 million people are
affected every year by cyclones, hurricanes, and
typhoons; nearly 366,000 by landslides; and 102
million by floods (Leoni et al., 2010). Poor people are
more affected by disasters than any other economic
group. From 2000 to 2010, economic damage as a
result of disasters totaled US $1 trillion; in 2010 alone,
the total estimated damage was US $109 billion.

Figure 2. Percentage of people killed by disasters by region.
Source: Leoni et al., 2010, p. 28

As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the Americas had the
highest percentage of people killed due to natural
disasters in 2010. But, overall between 2000 and
2009, the Asia region has the most number of
disasters.
Figure 4, shows the global economic damage due to
hazards from 1970–2010. There is a sharp increase
in hazards between 1995 and 2010. One reason
could be the present-day availability of technology
used to identify and determine the cost of disaster
damages.
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, floods and storms
affect the most number of people, as well as cause
many deaths. Therefore these two types of disasters
are extremely common and deadly. Decision making
for these types of disasters have to be treated with
utmost care and respect. Throughout life, humans
experience circumstances requiring them to make
decisions involving probability information. These
circumstances often require responding quickly, and
the outcomes of these decisions can have life
changing consequences (Andrzejewska et al., 2013).

Figure 3. Disaster occurrence by area. Source: Leoni et al., 2010,
p. 29

Figure 4. Global economic damages from hazards, 1970-2010.
Source: Leoni et al., 2010, p. 27

More than 226 million people are affected by disasters
every year, and in 2010 alone, 373 disasters resulted
in the deaths of 226,000 and affected 207,000
persons. From 2000–2010, 400 disasters accounted
for 98,000 deaths and 226,000 million affected each
year. In total, 1,077,683 people lost their lives while
2.4 billion were affected by disasters during the
decade (Leoni et al., 2010).
3. DECISION MAKING
Decision making is one of the basic cognitive
processes of human behaviors by which a preferred

Figure 5. Disaster occurrence by Area. Source: Leoni et al., 2010,
p. 29
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Figure 6. Disaster occurrence by disaster type, Source: Leoni et
al., 2010, p. 29
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Figure 7. Decision-making process

Figure 8. Decision-making process. Source: FEMA, 2005

Figure 9. The risk management process Source: International
Organization for Standardization [ISO], n.d., p. 14

option or a course of actions is chosen from among
a set of alternatives based on certain criteria (Wang
& Ruhe, 2007). People make decisions to carry out
their daily tasks. In an organisation, decisions are
made at every level and some get approved,
discarded, or even stalled according to its culture
and sometimes due to inherent bureaucratic

processes. Decision makers are a special breed of
people who are given the task to make responsible
decisions, often from the responsible roles within
organisations. Decisions are made to provide
solutions to problems and to prevent a problem from
being created; decision making creates many
scenarios and actions that are connected with many
outcomes. The outcomes of decisions change
according to the dynamics of the situation. Also, the
decision making depends on the decision maker’s
abilities, characteristics, and approach towards
reaching a solution.
The decision making varies between normal-day
decisions making to extreme-disaster-event decision
making, such as natural weather events or even
man-made disasters. Decision making during
disasters changes the dynamics involved with
decision-making processes and, most of the time,
creates panic situations. Each decision changes
according to the type of disaster and its magnitude.
Decision making must be flexible, responsive, and
capable of reacting to the unexpected in a timely and
effective manner (Lahidji, 2003). All disasters impact
people and communities, destroys or damages cities
and critical infrastructure, and impacts the
environment. But each disaster is different, and the
decisions have to suit the needs and requirements.
The time to evacuate a community to safety depends
on the type of disaster and the available time to
prepare and continue with the evacuation processes.
As shown in Figure 7, any person or a group of
people can make decisions, but only a few can
contribute toward a good outcome. To do this the
decision makers have to have the required skill sets.
But is it this simple or complicated when the cost of a
human life was estimated at $9.1 million by the
Environmental Protection Agency in 2011 (Partnoy,
2012).
Figure 8 shows a typical decision-making and
problem-solving process, which states that problem
solving is a set of activities designed to analyze a
situation systematically and find, implement, and
evaluate solutions. At each stage, a decision is
required, and it is a mechanism for making choices
at each step of the problem-solving process.
Decision making is part of problem solving, and
decision making occurs at every step of the problemsolving process (Federal Emergency Management
Agency [FEMA], 2005). Figure 9 shows a typical riskmanagement process, which has similar steps in
identifying the issues and drawing up solutions to
address the risk. In both these processes, decisions
are required to provide solutions. During a disaster
event, the main aim of the decision maker should be
to save as many lives as possible. Therefore,
decision making becomes an important element in
everyday process and activities. Decision making
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carries a certain amount of responsibility and
accountability. Decisions taken during disaster
events impact a larger community and business
audience and impacts on community, economy, and
the environment. Managing a response to
catastrophic incident requires timely, effective
decision making and a systematic management
approach that applies sound tested principles (U.S.
Department of Transportation [USDOT & U.S.
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2006).
Therefore, it is important to identify the decision
maker’s capabilities before they are faced with a
critical event. Decision making and management
capabilities are critical to developing and
implementing a successful emergency response
plan (USDOT & DHS, 2006). The economic impact
of large-scale disasters is significant at the local
level, with physical destruction on a large magnitude,
losses of lives, disruption or interruption of business
output, and sharp declines in consumption (Lahidji,
2003).
Hurricane Katrina was a wakeup call for the United
States, in that the hurricane revealed very significant
deficiencies in the nation’s ability to manage
catastrophic events (Tierney, 2009). Then there is
this question: how do we detect or identify a disaster
and how do we plan for such a disaster? How do we
communicate the disaster to the people who will be
impacted by this hazard, and who is responsible for
taking correct action to notify the people and all
relevant organizations? In the aftermath of a
disaster, governments face considerable pressure to
intervene: to reduce or contain persisting dangers,
compensate victims, clean up and reconstruct
damaged areas, provide temporary shelters,
subsidise affected industries and local governments,
prevent liquidity crises, and restore confidence. In
some cases in the past, the fiscal costs of disaster
response have exceeded 1% of GDP for several
years (Lahidji, 2003). The decision maker will take
action according to a set number of priorities, such
as saving people is more important than saving
critical infrastructure or vice versa. Therefore, the
person responsible for making these critical
decisions need to have the capability to understand
the intensity of the hazard and have situational
awareness of the affected area. Disasters can affect
everyone and are, therefore, everybody’s business
(Leoni et al., 2010).
In the United States, the National Response Plan
defines a catastrophic incident as: “Any natural or
man-made incident, including terrorism that results in
extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or
disruption severely affecting the population,
infrastructure, environment, economy, national

morale, and/or government functions.” A catastrophic
event could result in sustained national impacts over
a prolonged period of time; almost immediately
exceeds resources normally available to State, local,
tribal, and private sector authorities in the impacted
area; and significantly interrupts governmental
operations and emergency services to such an
extent that national security could be threatened.
(Townsend, 2006).
3.1. Decision-Making Styles
There are many decision-making styles used by
decision makers. As shown in Table 1, to arrive at a
decision, many types of decision-making styles can
be used.
The actions that are emitting from each decision are
different and the mitigation of the impact on the
society, economy, environment and critical
infrastructure also differs. Decision making also
depends on the culture of the organisation and size
of the organisation.
Table 1. Decision-making styles
Autocratic—where
one responsible
decision maker
makes all the relevant
decisions

Individual Decision Making: In
individual decision making, the leader
must make the decision alone, and
input from others is limited to collecting
relevant information.

Pseudo-consultative

Decision Making Through
Consultation: In consultation, the
leader shares the issue with one or
more people—seeking ideas, opinions,
and suggestions—and then makes a
decision. The leader considers the
input of others, but the final decision
may or may not be influenced by it.
Delegating the Decision: When
delegating a decision, the leader sets
the parameters then allows one or
more others to make the final decision.
Although the leader does not make the
decision, he or she supports it.
Where everyone has an opportunity to
input their views into the decisionmaking process.
The decisions are made according to
results, empirical analysis, and also
depends on the decision makers’
behavioural patterns
In this case, the leader and others work
together until they reach a consensus
decision. Each group member’s
opinion and point of view is considered.
As a result of helping to make the
decision, group members buy into the
final decision and commit to supporting
its implementation.

Consultative
Participative

Delegatory

Democratic
Directive/Analytical/
Conceptual &
Behavioural
Group Decision
Making

3.2. Factors That Influence Decision Making
As shown in Table 2, the decisions are influenced by
many factors.
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3.3. Responsibilities of a Decision Maker

Table 4. Attributes of an effective decision maker

A responsible decision maker should have the
knowledge about the situation and be able to carry
out a situational analysis; available resources to
carry out the whole process of decision making,
implementation and other related requirements;
team capabilities; able to understand the constraints
and available time; and the level of collaboration,
available technology, and experienced staff.

Knowledge.

3.4. Characteristics of a Decision-Making Process
Defined process or framework/clear and transparent
steps in the process/inclusiveness of all
stakeholders/leadership
People have different styles of making decisions that
depend on their personality or psychological type.
Psychological type is a composite of our preferences
or preferred ways of taking in and organizing
information. We tend to favor one of four ways of
approaching a problem:
Decisions can be as simple as delegating a routine
task or as complex as responding to a major crisis.
Decision making in a crisis is made more difficult
because of stress.
The other area that has a bigger impact on decision
making is the management structure. This may vary
between having a rigid vertical communication
structure to a flat one or even have a high degree of
coordination and formulation structures. As per the

Initiative.

Advice-seeking.

Selectivity.
Comprehensiveness.

Currency.
Flexibility.

Good judgment.

Table2. Factors which influences decision making

Calculated risktaking.

Time available to
make decisions

Quality of
information

Self-knowledge.

Experience of past
practice

Making sense of
information

Practical Knowledge
gained

Available resources

Clear roles

Theoretical
knowledge gained

Knowledge of
affected areas

Situational
awareness

Political factors

Financial factors

Environmental
factors

Safety factors

Ethical factors

Organisational
Culture

Size of organization

Experience of
decision maker

Informing
Strategic Planning
Source: FEMA, 2005

Problem Solving
Managing
Innovation and
Creativity
Planning and
organising
personnel
Network and
Partnering

Source: FEMA, 2005
Table 5. Decision maker’s qualities
Charismatic: final decisions based on
balanced information

Feeling (integrity)

Thinker: looks for extensive details
Sceptic: decides based on gut feelings
Follower: relies heavily on own or
other past decisions to make current
choices
Controller: only implements own ideas

Thinking (effectiveness)
Intuition (innovation)
Sensing (stability)

Source: FEMA, 2005

Table 3. Leadership characteristics for emergencies and disasters
Decisiveness
Flexibility

The most important requirement for
making sound decisions is a deep
understanding of all factors. The
soundness of the decision depends on
how informed the decision maker is.
Effective decision makers assume
responsibility for beginning the decisionmaking process and seeing it through.
They take an active
part in making things better.
Good decision makers know that they
need help from others. They identify
people who can make specific
contributions to the decision-making
process and ask them for their advice
and counsel.
Effective decision makers seek pertinent
data. They avoid getting bogged down by
extraneous facts and figures.
On the other hand, they look at all
available options and consider every
possible alternative so as to make the
best choice.
Good decision makers consider current
conditions and take advantage of
opportunities that exist at the time.
Effective decision makers remain openminded about new concepts and ideas.
They are willing to change course or try a
different approach if better results seem
likely.
Sound decisions will not always result
from merely following procedures.
Decision makers must exercise their best
judgment in considering factors particular
to the situation.
The risks and results of various
alternatives must be weighed and the
consequences accepted, whether
positive or negative.
Good decision makers know their own
abilities, biases, and limitations.

Motivating
Managing teams and
team building
Scanning the
environment
Decision Making

Table 6. Impediments to making good decisions under stress
Perceived or realtime pressure.

Sleep deprivation
and resulting
fatigue.
Lack of information.

Possible political
pressures.
High- or lowblood sugar
levels as a result
of erratic eating
patterns.
Source: FEMA, 2005

Conflicting
information.
Uncertainty.

181
Table 7. Decisions made under stress
Under stress,
decision makers are
more likely to:
Experience conflict
with other key players.

Experience perception
distortion and poor
judgment.
Perceive selectively
because of sensory
overload, and thus
perhaps miss
important information.
Source: FEMA, 2005

Decision makers
under stress
also tend to:
Be less tolerant of
ambiguity and
thus perhaps
make premature
decisions.
Experience a
decreased ability
to handle difficult
tasks and work
productively.
Experience a
greater tendency
toward aggression
and escape
behaviors.

They may also:
Consider only
immediate survival
goals, sacrificing
long-range
considerations
Choose a risky
alternative.

Get tunnel vision.
Succumb to
“groupthink.”

case study, the selected stakeholders are U.S.
Congress, Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
FEMA, governors and mayors, Department of
Defence (DoD), and Department of Justice (DoJ).
These organisations have different communication
and decision-making styles. When each organisation
has to coordinate between each other, then the
cracks start to appear.
4. CASE STUDY: HURRICANE KATRINA
Risk is the probability of harmful consequences or
expected losses (deaths, injuries, property,
livelihoods, economic activity disrupted, or
environment damaged) resulting from interactions
between natural or human-induced hazards and
vulnerable populations (Leoni et al., 2010).
The report has selected 2005’s Hurricane Katrina.
The case study is divided into two sections,
Prelandfall and Postlandfall.
4.1

Prelandfall Facts

Figure 10 shows the Hurricane strikes from 1950–
2009 in the Gulf Coast Region, and Figure 11 shows
the tropical storms and hurricanes from 1851—2004
in the same region. Figure 12 shows the intensities
of the hurricanes. Therefore, from Figures 10—12, it
is shown that hurricanes and storms in the Gulf are
not new phenomena. This has been happening very
frequently throughout the Gulf.
Figure 10. Hurricane strikes (1950–2009). Source:
http://www.californiaacontractor.com/track_map.htm

Figure 11. Tropical storms and hurricanes (1851–2004). Source:
http://blog.cleanenergy.org/2011/09/05/how-wind-farms-weatherhurricanes/

The Mississippi Deltaic Plain (MDP) is a 25,000 sq.
km dynamic landscape of water, wetlands, and low
upland ridges formed as a series of overlapping
delta lobes. (Day et al., 2007). Since 1559, 172
hurricanes have struck southern Louisiana; of these,
38 have caused flooding in New Orleans, usually via
Lake Pontchartrain (Rogers, 2008). Therefore, the
Katrina disaster cannot be classified as a surprise, in
both the short and long term. Ample warning of the
coming disaster was met with insufficient preparation
(Moynihan, 2009). Furthermore, “Katrina was the
much anticipated natural disaster in American history
and still government managed to fail at every level”
(Sobel & Leeson, 2006). “Hurricanes strike the
Louisiana coast with a mean frequency of two every
three years” (Rogers, 2008). Seventy-five hurricanes
of Katrina’s strength at landfall—a Category 3—have
hit the mainland United States since 1851, roughly
once every two years (Townsend, 2006).
Figure 13 shows the hurricane category by the wind
speeds.
4.2. New Orleans

Figure 12. Hurricane paths and intensities. Source:
http://blog.cleanenergy.org/2011/09/05/how-wind-farms-weatherhurricanes/

The New Orleans Metropolitan area is home to
approximately 1.4 million inhabitants (Wolshon,
2002). New Orleans has one of the highest poverty
rates (28%) in the United States (Fox & Gibbons,
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In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina created a trail of
destruction with wind speeds of 145 mph (232km/hr)
and storm surge of 27 feet (8.2 metres) across
93,000 sq. miles (240,861 sq. km), killed over 1,300
people, and is considered as the most destructive
natural disaster in U.S. history.
The storm surge it created along a stretch of the
northern Gulf Coast from Mobile, Alabama to New
Orleans, impacted nearly 93,000 sq. miles of our
nation—roughly an area the size of Great Britain
(Townsend, 2006).
Figure 13. Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale

2005). A 2000 census revealed that 27% of New
Orleans households, amounting to approximately
120,000 people, were without privately owned
transportation (Fox & Gibbons, 2005). Another report
states, “It is estimated that about 200,000 to 300,000
people do not have access to reliable personal
transportation” (Wolshon, 2002). Within the city of
New Orleans an elaborate system of drainage
collection, pumping, conveyance, and discharge has
been developed over the past hundred years, and
Rogers (2008) adds that, “New Orleans has always
been a high maintenance city for drainage and
receives an average rainfall of about 132cm per
year.” Further, the protection levee along Lake
Pontchartrain was erected after the 1893 hurricane
which generated a storm surge of up to 4 metres,
and federal involvement with the city’s drainage
canals began in 1955 with approval of the Lake
Pontchartrain and vicinity hurricane projection
project by Congress (Rogers, 2008). The report goes
on to state that, “Since 1928 the flood protection
along Mississippi River has been provided chiefly by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Mississippi River
and Tributaries project” (Rogers, 2008). All of New
Orleans and southeast Louisiana are highly
vulnerable to catastrophic flooding for flood events
that are in the neighbourhood of 0.2% or the 500year return period (Link, 2010). In southeast
Louisiana, communities unprotected by levees were
inundated, and the storm destroyed levees
protecting eastern New Orleans and the St. Bernard
and Plaquemines parishes to the south and east
(Day et al., 2007).
4.3. Postlandfall Facts
“Hurricane Katrina was one of the worst natural
disasters in our nation’s history and has caused
unimaginable devastation and heartbreak throughout
the Gulf Coast Region. A vast coastline of towns and
communities has been decimated,” said President
George W. Bush on September 8, 2005 (Townsend,
2006).

The disaster was not isolated to one town or city, or
even one state. Individual local and state plans, as
well as relatively new plans created by the Federal
Government since the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, failed to adequately account for
widespread
or
simultaneous
catastrophes
(Townsend, 2006). The report further adds that, the
consequences for New Orleans, which sits mostly
below sea level, were dire. Significant levee failures
occurred on the 17th Street Canal, the Industrial
Canal, and the London Avenue Canal. The flooding
destroyed New Orleans, the nation’s 35th largest city
(Townsend, 2006).
Over an estimated 18-hour period, approximately
80% of the city flooded with 6 to 20 feet of water,
necessitating one of the largest search-and-rescue
operations in our nation’s history caused by
breaches in its 350 mile levee system (Townsend,
2006).
The hurricane devastated CI power infrastructure in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The storm
surge damaged infrastructure systems and service
facilities,
regional
potable
water
systems,
wastewater treatment systems and sewage
treatment plants, cooling towers at oil refineries,
chemical plants, power stations, highway bridges.
Super structures were damaged costing close to
$100 billion, residential structure and content
damages of $75 billion, electric utility damages of
$231 million, highway damages of $3 billion, sewer
system damages of $1.2 billion, completely
destroyed or made uninhabitable an estimated
300,000 homes, and commercial revenue losses of
$4.6 billion .
There was an extensive loss of traffic-control devices
such as traffic lights, regulatory signs, and directional
signs. Flooding blocked access to the police and fire
dispatch centers and prevented fire crews from
being able to suppress burning fires. Local
emergency response officials found it difficult or
impossible to establish functioning incident
command structures in these conditions. The federal
response suffered from significant organization and
coordination problems during this week of crisis.
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line, an estimated 27% in comparison to the national
rate of 12% (Talbot, Goldberg, & Carr, 2005).
5. DECISION-MAKING GAPS IN THE SYSTEM
Decisions taken during Hurricane Katrina are
assessed to identify any shortcomings.
President Bush

Figure 14. U.S natural disasters that caused the most deaths and
damage to property in each decade (Townsend, 2006).
Table 8. Estimated damage from Hurricane Katrina and the New
Orleans Flood

Officials responded to Hurricane Katrina without a
comprehensive
understanding
of
the
interdependencies of the critical infrastructure
sectors in each geographic area and the potential
national impact of their decisions.
The dark blue bars in Figure 14 show the decreasing
number of deaths caused by natural disasters in the
period from 1900—2005. The light blue bars show
the increasing amount of damage caused by these
same natural disasters adjusted to third-quarter 2005
dollars (Townsend, 2006).
Hurricane Katrina’s damage was extensive. The
storm destroyed so many homes, buildings, forests,
and green spaces that an extraordinary amount of
debris was left behind—118 million cubic yards
(Townsend, 2006).
When the winds and floods of Hurricane Katrina
subsided, an estimated 1,330 people were dead as a
result of the storm. The vast majority of the
fatalities—an estimated 80%—came from the New
Orleans metropolitan area. Of the total known
fatalities, there are almost 200 unclaimed bodies
remaining at the Victim Identification Center in
Carville, Louisiana. As of February 17, 2006, there
were still 2,096 people from the Gulf Coast area
reported missing. Around 770,000 people were
displaced—the largest since the Dust Bowl migration
from the southern Great Plains region in the 1930s
(Townsend, 2006).
According to the U.S. Census Bureau the city of New
Orleans has approximately 484,000 residents of
which approximately 130,000 live under the poverty

Responsibilities:
•
The White House shares responsibility for the inadequate
prelandfall preparations. To be sure, President Bush, at the
request of Brown, did take the initiative to personally call
Governor Blanco to urge a mandatory evacuation.
Correct Decisions:
•
On September 26, 2005, President Bush urged Congress to
consider amending the Posse Comitatus Act in order for the
U.S. forces to take control without delay in the aftermath of a
disaster. The Posse Comitatus Act is a federal ruling that
limits the ability of the government to use arm forces to
respond to domestic events such as floods.
•
He also took the unusual step of declaring an emergency in
the Gulf Coast States prior to Katrina’s landfall.
Substandard Decisions:
•
The White House failed to deconflict varying damage
assessments and discounted information that ultimately
proved accurate.
•
On the other hand, the President did not leave his Texas
ranch to return to Washington until two days after landfall,
and only then convened his Cabinet, as well as a White
House task force, to oversee federal response efforts.
•
Throughout Monday, the day of the storm, the President
maintained his regular schedule. In the morning, he
celebrated Senator John McCain’s birthday at Luke Air Force
Base near Phoenix, Arizona. He also spoke to the people in
the Gulf Coast region, offering that, “When the storm passes,
the federal government has got assets and resources that we
will be deploying to help you.
•
Despite these reports of a catastrophe, the White House
failed to grasp the gravity of the situation as it unfolded. As a
result, the White House’s initial response appeared halting
and inadequate.
Federal
Responsibilities:
•
When effective response is beyond the capabilities of the
state and the affected local governments, the Stafford Act
provides for federal assistance upon the request of the state
and local governments.
•
Federal departments and agencies were required to develop
supporting operational plans and standard operating
procedures (SOPs) to integrate their activities into the
national response. In almost all cases, the integrating SOPs
were either nonexistent or still under development when
Hurricane Katrina hit.
•
The Federal Government had the Authority to Assist with
Pre-Landfall Evacuation, Even in the Absence of a Request
for Assistance from State and Local Governments.
Substandard Actions:
•
The Federal government did not reach out to state or local
authorities about transportation alternatives for those lacking
means for prelandfall evacuation.
•
Lack of coordination at the Federal headquarters level
reflected confusing organizational structures in the field.
•
The lack of communications and situational awareness had a
debilitating effect on the Federal response. Even after
coordinating elements were in place, Federal departments
and agencies continued to have difficulty adapting their
standard procedures to this catastrophic incident.
•
The Federal response suffered from significant organization
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•

and coordination problems during this week of crisis.
The Federal government’s problems responding to Hurricane
Katrina illustrate greater systemic weaknesses inherent in
our current national preparedness system: the lack of
expertise in the areas of response, recovery, and
reconstruction.

Homeland Security
Responsibilities:
•
Homeland Security takes the lead in coordinating the
response to provide supplies, help with cleanup, and
provide aid to those whose homes are destroyed.
Gaps:
•
Our current system for homeland security does not provide
the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed
by twenty-first-century catastrophic threats.
Failures:
•
The Homeland Security Operations Center failed to provide
valuable situational information to the White House and key
operational officials during the disaster.

•

Command centers in the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and elsewhere in the Federal government had
unclear, and often overlapping, roles and responsibilities
that were exposed as flawed during this disaster.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Statutory authorities and presidential directives establish the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the central federal
entity for preparedness for and response to disasters.
Responsibilities:
Authorities invested DHS with at least four categories of
responsibility:
1. Leadership.
a. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
has clear duties to lead and manage the federal response
to disasters such as Katrina.
b. He carries ultimate responsibility for managing FEMA and
other DHS components and is charged with coordinating
overall federal operations.
c. The Secretary must marshal federal resources, decide
whether to appoint a Principal Federal Official to lead the
federal response on the ground, and decide whether to
implement the Catastrophic Incident Annex, which
provides for an accelerated, proactive national response to
a catastrophic incident.
2. Coordination and Support.
a. DHS can use various structures and resources to
coordinate and support the overall response effort.
b. Recommendations to the Secretary, who has the power to
activate the IIMG based on the nature, severity,
magnitude, and complexity of a threat or incident.
3. Operational Responsibilities.
a. DHS has significant, ground-level operational
responsibilities in responding to disasters.
b. DHS and its component agencies are primary or
coordinating agencies for nine of the 15 Emergency
Support Functions (ESFs) in the NRP—categories of
federal capabilities that can be brought to bear to provide
support in domestic incidents—including public safety and
security, communications support, and emergency
management.
c. DHS components such as the Coast Guard also have
significant missions and statutory responsibilities
independent of the NRP.
4. Preparedness.
a. Besides its response roles, DHS has primary responsibility
for strengthening national preparedness—including the
planning, training, and equipment necessary to prevent,

respond to, and recover from major domestic incidents—
under HSPD-8 and the Homeland Security Act.
b. Section 502 of the Homeland Security Act gives the
Secretary, acting through the FEMA Director, responsibility
for “helping to ensure the effectiveness of emergency
response providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters,
and other emergencies.”
c.
The Department has authority over primary grants and
training programs for state and local first responders and
emergency managers. Pursuant to HSPD-8, DHS has
developed a National Preparedness Goal, establishing
national emergency-management and preparedness
priorities.
d.
DHS ties its preparedness requirements to grant funding,
requiring that all states submit emergency plans in order to
get funding and that the money be used to meet the
capabilities and priorities set forth by the National
Preparedness Goal.
5. DHS has assumed responsibilities under the Robert T.
Stafford Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act).
Stafford Act authorizes and provides the administrative
mechanisms for the federal government to assist state and
local governments in disasters.
6. DHS was created to bring together multiple, disparate
agencies to create synergy and ensure a coordinated
approach to preventing, preparing for, and responding to
catastrophes, whether caused by terrorism or nature.
Failures:
•
DHS leaders failed to bring a sense of urgency to the federal
government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina.
•
DHS did not fully adapt or adequately train to meet its
obligations under the NRP before Hurricane Katrina.
•
Nor did the Department address the known deficiencies of
FEMA, such as staffing shortages, inadequate training, poor
commodities tracking, and insufficient plans for post-disaster
communications.
•
In the critical days before landfall, DHS leadership mostly
watched from the sidelines, allowed FEMA to take the lead,
and missed critical opportunities to help prepare the entire
federal government for the response.
•
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is
charged with preparing for and responding to domestic
incidents, whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters, failed
to lead an effective federal response to Hurricane Katrina.
•
DHS was slow to recognize the scope of the disaster or that
FEMA had become overwhelmed.
•
DHS—as the Department charged with preparing for and
responding to domestic incidents, whether terrorist attacks or
natural disasters—failed to effectively lead the federal
response to Hurricane Katrina.
•
DHS and its leaders failed to prepare the nation adequately
for the unprecedented devastation of Hurricane Katrina.
•
DHS leadership failed to bring a sense of urgency to the
federal government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and
Secretary Chertoff himself should have been more engaged
in preparations over the weekend before landfall.
Secretary of Homeland Security
Responsibilities:
•
The Secretary of Homeland Security, is the President’s
principal Federal official for domestic incident management,
but he had difficulty coordinating the disparate activities of
Federal departments and agencies.
•
The Secretary of Homeland Security has a clear duty to lead
and manage the federal response to disasters such as
Katrina.
•
The Secretary should have invoked the Catastrophic Incident
Annex to direct the federal response posture to fully switch
from a reactive to proactive mode of operations. Absent the
Secretary’s invocation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex,
the federal response evolved into a push system over
several days.
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•

During actual or potential Incidents of National Significance,
the overall coordination of federal incident management
activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
•
It also made the Secretary responsible for developing and
administering the National Response Plan (NRP) and the
National Incident Management System (NIMS)
•
decisions made by DHS leadership weakened FEMA and
impeded its ability to respond to disasters.
Substandard Decisions:
•
Secretary Chertoff failed to appoint a Principal Federal
Official (PFO), the official charged with overseeing the
federal response under the NRP, until 3 hours after landfall.
•
Secretary Chertoff failed to make ready the full range of
federal assets pursuant to DHS’s responsibilities under the
National Response Plan (NRP).
•
With local and state resources immediately overwhelmed,
rapid federal mobilization of resources was critical. Yet
reliable information on such vital developments as the levee
failures, the extent of flooding, and the presence of
thousands of people in need of life-sustaining assistance at
the New Orleans Convention Center did not reach the White
House, Secretary Chertoff , or other key officials for hours,
and in some cases more than a day
•
Secretary Chertoff made only top-level
inquiries into
the state of preparations, and accepted uncritically the
reassurances he received.
•
He did not appear to reach out to the other Cabinet
secretaries to make sure that they were readying their
departments to provide whatever assistance DHS—and the
people of the Gulf Coast—might need.
•
Similarly, had he invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex of
the National Response Plan (NRP-CIA), Secretary Chertoff
could have helped remove uncertainty about the federal
government’s need and authority to take initiative before
landfall and signaled that all federal government agencies
were expected to think—and act—proactively in preparing for
and responding to Katrina.
Failures:
• The Secretary lacked real-time, accurate situational
awareness of both the facts from the disaster area as well as
the on-going response activities of the Federal, State, and
local players.
FEMA
Responsibilities:
•
FEMA has responsibilities in both disaster response and
recovery.
•
Response includes actions taken during or after an
emergency.
•
Recovery involves short-term activities to return life-support
systems after an emergency—such as rebuilding and assisting
victims in dealing with damage caused by a disaster.
•
Once the 17th Street Canal levee had been breached and the
city was overwhelmed it was FEMA's responsibility
to step in.
Substandard Decisions:
•
FEMA’s former Director, Michael Brown, lacked the
leadership skills that were needed. Before landfall, Brown did
not direct the adequate pre-positioning of critical personnel
and equipment, and will fully failed to communicate with DHS
Secretary, Michael Chertoff, to whom he was supposed to
report.
•
Brown and most of his front-office staff had little or no
emergency-management experience prior to joining FEMA.
•
Brown, then in Louisiana, contributed to the problem by
refusing to communicate with Secretary Chertoff, opting
instead to pass information directly to White House staff.
•
Brown sent a single employee, without operational expertise
or equipment and from the New England region to New
Orleans before landfall.

•

the leadership at the time of Katrina also lacked basic
management experience and the leadership ability required
to coordinate the entire federal government’s response to a
catastrophic event.
•
circumvented his chain of command and failed to
communicate critical information to the Secretary
•
failed to deliver on commitments made to Louisiana’s
leaders for buses
•
travelled to Baton Rouge with FEMA public-affairs and
congressional-relations employees and a personal aide, and
no operational experts
•
failed to adequately carry out responsibilities as FEMA’s lead
official in the Gulf before landfall and when he was appointed
as the Principal Federal Official after landfall.
Failures:
•
FEMA failed to adequately develop emergency-response
capabilities assigned to it under the National Response Plan.
•
FEMA’s senior political appointees, including Director
Michael Brown and Deputy Director Patrick Rhode, had little
or no prior relevant emergency-management experience
before joining FEMA.
•
FEMA was unprepared for a catastrophic event of the scale
of Katrina.
•
FEMA lacked the tools to track the status of shipments,
interfering with the management of supplying food, water,
ice, and other vital commodities to those in need across the
Gulf Coast.
•
Michael Brown, FEMA’s Director, was insubordinate,
unqualified, and counterproductive
•
failed to organize FEMA’s or other federal eff orts in any
meaningful way.
•
FEMA had budget shortages that hindered its preparedness.
•
FEMA’s emergency-response teams were inadequately
trained, exercised, and equipped.
•
Prior to Katrina’s landfall, FEMA suffered from a number of
problems: unqualified senior political leadership, budget
shortages, personnel shortages, and inadequate response
capabilities.
•
FEMA tried to get additional funding from DHS, but the
requests were generally denied
•
Over the last few years, FEMA has operated with a 15 to 20
percent vacancy rate; many positions cannot be filled
because of budget shortages
•
FEMA is a small agency with approximately 2,500 permanent
full-time employees. Over the last few years, FEMA has
suffered numerous personnel problems, hindering its ability
to prepare for and respond to a catastrophic event.
•
The ability of FEMA to respond to a natural disaster of this
magnitude had not been tested under the Bush
Administration.
National Response Plan (NRP)
•
•

National Response Plan released in December of 2004.
The NRP further confirms DHS’s central role in disaster
preparedness and response.
•
The National Response Plan (NRP) was intended to form the
basis of the federal government’s response to disasters and
for its interaction with state and local governments during
such events.
•
One main element of the National Preparedness System is
the National Response Plan (NRP).
Failures:
•
Under the current response framework, the Federal
government merely “coordinates” resources to meet the
needs of local and State governments based upon their
requests for assistance.
•
This lack of understanding of the “National” plan not
surprisingly resulted in ineffective coordination of the
Federal, State, and local response.
•
the response to Katrina did not go as planned is that The
NRP was relatively new to many at the Federal, State, and
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•
•
•
•

•

local levels before the events of Hurricane Katrina.
The Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) did not function
as envisioned in the NRP.
The National Response Plan’s Mission Assignment process
proved to be far too bureaucratic to support the response to
a catastrophe.
in that it clearly defines the roles and interagency
responsibilities for the management of all disasters as
deemed by DHS to be incidents of national significance.
This framework does not address the conditions of a
catastrophic event with large scale competing needs,
insufficient resources, and the absence of functioning local
governments.
Consequently, some of the specific procedures and
processes of the NRP were not properly implemented, and
Federal partners had to operate without any prescribed
guidelines or chains of command.

Gov. Kathleen Blanco
Correct Decisions:
•
On August 26, 2005, Governor Blanco declared a state of
emergency in order to initiate the pre-positioning of Federal
commodities at Federal Operations Staging Areas (FOSA’s).
•
Once Governor Blanco declared a state of emergency FEMA
Logistics pre-positioned commodities such as ice, water and
Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) at the closest FOSAs.
Substandard Decisions:
•
Governor Blanco Did Not Request Transportation Resources
From the Federal Government for Pre-landfall Evacuation.
•
Gov. Kathleen Blanco was aware that she needed help but
due to lack of constant communication and competency in
dealing with disasters, did not know what to ask for.
•
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Louisiana Governor
Kathleen Blanco—who knew the limitations of their resources
to address a catastrophe—did not specify those needs
adequately to the federal government before landfall. For
example, while Governor Blanco stated in a letter to
President Bush, two days before landfall, that she anticipated
the resources of the state would be overwhelmed, she made
no specific request for assistance in evacuating the known
tens of thousands of people without means of transportation,
and a senior State official identified no unmet needs in
response to a federal offer of assistance the following day.
The Mayor
Responsibilities:
•
the Mayor, who was supposed to be in charge of the
emergency operations, was rarely seen in the EOC.
Substandard Decisions:
•
Delayed mandatory Evacuation order
•
had used the Superdome twice prior to Hurricane Katrina as
a shelter of last resort. The first time, during Hurricane
Georges it turned out to be a disaster and the second time,
During Hurricane Ivan it proved to be better organized.
Unfortunately, its use during Hurricane Katrina fared not so
well once again.
•
On August 28, 2005 Mayor Nagin made evacuation of the
city mandatory.
Failures and Key Findings
Findings:
•
The storm demonstrated the need for greater integration and
synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only throughout
the Federal government, but also with the State and local
governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well.
•
Following a catastrophic disaster, the traditional mode of
operation may not work if state and local governments are so
overwhelmed that they can’t effectively make specific
requests for assistance. In such circumstances the National

Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex provides for a
more proactive federal response.
•
Under our system of federalism, state and local governments
bear the primary responsibility for responding to
emergencies. As such, they generally manage the response
to an incident in the first instance.
•
Four overarching factors contributed to the failures of
Hurricane Katrina:
o
long-term warnings went unheeded and government
officials neglected their duties to prepare for a
forewarned catastrophe
o
government officials took insufficient actions or made
poor decisions in the days immediately before and after
landfall
o
systems on which officials relied to support their
response eff orts failed, and
o
Government officials at all levels failed to provide
effective leadership.
•
Many Residents Disregarded the Mandatory Evacuation
Orders Due to Complacency, Poor Evacuation Experiences,
and Insufficient Financial Resources to Support Themselves
and Their Families on the Road.
•
The Director of the City of New Orleans Office of Emergency
Preparedness Turned Down Offers of Assistance With the
Pre-landfall Evacuation From the Regional Transit Authority
(RTA).
Failures:
•
The City of New Orleans Failed to Prepare a Draft Mandatory
Evacuation Order Before Katrina Approached the Gulf Coast
•
Ineffective execution of the National Response Plan.
•
An under-trained and under-staffed Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
•
A Catastrophic Incident Annex that was never invoked, and
doubt that it would have done the job anyway.
•
A perplexing inability to learn from Hurricane Pam and other
exercises.
•
Levees not built to withstand the most severe hurricanes.
•
An incomplete evacuation that led to deaths and tremendous
suffering.
•
A complete breakdown in communications that paralysed
command and control and made situational awareness murky
at best.
•
The failure of state and local officials to maintain law and order.
•
Haphazard and incomplete emergency shelter and housing
plans.
•
An overwhelmed FEMA logistics and contracting system that
could not support the effective provision of urgently needed
supplies.
•
The readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response teams
was inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of the federal
response.
•
DHS and FEMA lacked adequate trained and experienced
staff for the Katrina response.
•
Federal agencies, including DHS, had varying degrees of
unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities under the
National Response Plan and National Incident Management
System.
•
FEMA was unprepared—and has never been prepared—for
a catastrophic event of the scale of Katrina.
•
The Committee’s investigation found systemic and
leadership failures, displayed in both the preparation for and
response to Hurricane Katrina, at both the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and FEMA.
•
The Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)—
charged with providing reliable information to decision
makers including the Secretary of DHS and the President—
failed to create a system to identify and acquire all available,
relevant information, and as a result situational awareness
was deeply flawed.
•
Long-term and short-term warnings went unheeded
•
The Committee believes that leadership failures needlessly
compounded these losses.
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•
•

•
•
•

Lack of coordination at the Federal headquarters-level
reflected confusing organizational structures in the field.
The Federal government’s problems responding to Hurricane
Katrina illustrate greater systemic weaknesses inherent in
our current national preparedness system: the lack of
expertise in the areas of response, recovery, and
reconstruction. Insufficient planning, training, and
interagency coordination are not problems that began and
ended with Hurricane Katrina. The storm demonstrated the
need for greater integration and synchronization of
preparedness efforts, not only throughout the Federal
government, but also with the State and local governments
and the private and non-profit sectors as well
Our current system for homeland security does not provide
the necessary framework to manage the challenges posed
by 21st Century catastrophic threats.
The Federal response suffered from significant organization
and coordination problems during this week of crisis.
The lack of communications and situational awareness had a
debilitating effect on the Federal response. Even after
coordinating elements were in place, Federal departments
and agencies continued to have difficulty adapting their
standard procedures to this catastrophic incident

6. CONCLUSION
The report highlighted using a case study on how
decisions are made. Most of the time, gaps in
decisions are made clearer after a disaster.
The case study highlighted the fact that from the
highest ranking officer to the lowest ranking officer
who were involved with decision making, they failed
to carry out the most important aspect of decision
making during disasters, saving lives. There were
breakdowns in the chain of command in all areas
from evacuation planning to communication and
sheltering to transport. I agree that it is not easy to
find solutions to every disaster, but people at
responsible places must carry out their duties or
should get the required guidance and training.
The laws of the country should be followed for an
incident. In the United States, the following four are
referred to as relevant for this incident.
•

Title VI of the Stafford Act also places
significant responsibilities for national
emergency preparedness on the FEMA
Director and, through the Homeland Security
Act, on DHS, providing, among other things,
that the federal government is to provide the
necessary
direction,
guidance,
and
assistance “so that a comprehensive
preparedness system exists for all hazards.”

•

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8
(HSPD-8) issued on December 17, 2003,
further designated the Secretary as “the
principal Federal official for coordinating the
implementation of all-hazards preparedness
in the United States.”

•

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
(HSPD-5), issued by President Bush on

February 28, 2003, formally designated the
Secretary of Homeland Security as the
“principal federal official for domestic
incident management.”
•

The Homeland Security Act of 2002
established the Department and provides
that one of DHS’s missions is “acting as a
focal point regarding natural and manmade
crises and emergency planning.”

All the other responsibilities are aligned under these
statutory regulations. As shown in the case study, the
main failures were not following the standards that
were adopted by the States.
“As we are all aware, disasters are very political
events,” said FEMA Director James Lee Witt. (Sobel
& Leeson, 2006). Decision making varies according
to many factors. In 2005, Hyogo Framework for
Action 2005–2015 (HFA) was formulated to provide
the following strategies, three strategic goals: to
integrate disaster risk reduction into sustainable
development policies and planning; to develop and
strengthen institutions, mechanisms, and capacities
to build resilience to hazards; and to systematically
incorporate risk reduction approaches into the
implementation
of
emergency
preparedness,
response, and recovery programs (United Nations,
2008).
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